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STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM: STATE-COURT
DEFERENCE OR DISSONANCE?
ARTHUR LEAVENS*
INTRODUCTION
Some twenty-five years ago Lawrence Sager asked “the inevi
table question” concerning state constitutionalism, a question that
even then was beginning to sound old; that is, “to what extent, if
any, should state judges faced with claims under provisions of their
state constitutions feel themselves bound to defer to Supreme
Court interpretations of equivalent federal constitutional provi
sions?”1 Purely as a matter of positive law, Dean Sager’s answer to
this question was, almost never.2 This potential for state-court dis
sonance owed to what Dean Sager described as “vast” spaces in our
federal constitutional law that remain “untiled,” leaving ample lati
tude for state-court judges to fill in these spaces with state-constitu
tional law.3 But just because state courts can disagree with the
Supreme Court does not mean that they should. As Dean Sager
noted, the argument for state-court deference to Supreme Court
interpretations of what are fundamental norms common to both the
nation and its fifty states does not rest on the lack of positive statelaw authority for such independent interpretations “but [rather] on
* Professor of Law, Western New England University School of Law. I would
like to thank my colleagues Bruce Miller, Sam Stonefield, and Giovanna Shay for their
encouragement and thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this Article and Dean Art
Gaudio for providing support and assistance for this project.
1. Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword: State Courts and the Strategic Space Between
the Norms and Rules of Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 959, 959 (1985).
2. Id. at 960. Dean Sager qualified his answer with what he characterized as two
“rather minor” conditions, i.e., first, that the state-constitutional decisions be clearly
ones of state, not federal, law, see Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983), and
second, that the decisions be ones that do not conflict with what he termed “extant
federal constitutional norms,” presumably including the Fourteenth Amendment’s doc
trine of incorporation. Sager, supra note 1, at 959.
3. Sager, supra note 1, at 960. By “untiled” constitutional space, Dean Sager was
referring to potential constitutional protection of individual rights that either had not
yet been decided by the Supreme Court under the Constitution or was more protective
than that which the Supreme Court had interpreted the Constitution to provide, in ei
ther case leaving room for state-constitutional authority. Id.
81
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notions” of decisional legitimacy and “judicial responsibility.”4 If
some deference is called for, what, as Dean Sager reframes the
question, is its “operational content”?5
None of this was new even a quarter century ago; yet, though
the scholarship has been rich,6 the question still remains. This Arti
cle will focus on one area of the debate, that concerning state con
stitutional expansion of criminal-procedure protections. This
Article will examine two such rights: (1) the protection against un
reasonable searches and seizures;7 and (2) the right to the assistance
of counsel in defending a criminal case.8 Each of these rights is
embodied in both the federal and most, if not all, state constitu
tions. Each right is thus doubly applicable to the states, first,
through the federal version by virtue of its incorporation into the
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process protection and, second,
through the state constitution’s version of the cognate right. So fo
cused, the question is, what deference if any does a state court owe
the Supreme Court in interpreting state constitutional provisions
protecting against unreasonable searches and seizures and affording
the criminally accused the right to counsel?
This Article will explore this question of deference in the con
text of a particular state, Massachusetts, employing that focus for
three reasons. First, the Commonwealth’s Declaration of Rights—
which has remained virtually unchanged since its adoption in
1780—served as a principal model for the federal Bill of Rights,9
4.
5.
6.

Id.
Id. at 961.
A sample of the literature includes JAMES A. GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE
CONSTITUTIONS (2005) [hereinafter INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS]; G. ALAN
TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1998); Shirley S. Abrahamson, Crimi
nal Law and State Constitutions: The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L.
REV. 1141(1985); Symposium, Dual Enforcement of Constitutional Norms, 46 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1219 (2005); Lawrence Friedman, Reactive and Incompletely Theorized
State Constitutional Decision-Making, 77 MISS. L.J. 265 (2007); Jack L. Landau, Hurrah
for Revolution: A Critical Assessment of State Constitutional Interpretation, 79 OR. L.
REV. 793 (2000); Hans Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the State’s Bill of Rights,
9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379 (1980); Symposium, Independent State Grounds: Should State
Courts Depart from the Fourth Amendment in Construing Their Own Constitutions, and
if so, on What Basis Beyond Simple Disagreement with the United States Supreme
Court’s Result?, 77 MISS. L.J. 1 (2007); Robert F. Williams, In the Glare of the Supreme
Court: Continuing Methodology and Legitimacy Problems in Independent State Consti
tutional Rights Adjudication, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1015 (1997) [hereinafter In the
Glare of the Supreme Court].
7. See infra notes 128-169 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 95-127 and accompanying text.
9. See Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 157-58 (1947) (reviewing this histori
cal linkage); see also Akhil R. Amar, The Fourth Amendment, Boston, and the Writs of
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leaving no doubt but that textually and historically the federal and
state provisions at issue here are essentially the same. This poses
the interpretive question most starkly; in each case, we are consid
ering federal and state versions of what was to their respective
framers the same normative protection. Second, unlike most state
court judges, the justices of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court are appointed and have lifetime tenure, putting them in the
same, politically-insulated position as their federal counterparts.10
This poses the issue of decisional legitimacy in bold relief, forcing
consideration of the counter-majoritarian aspects of judicial review.
Finally, the Supreme Judicial Court has been quite active over the
past three decades in this area of state constitutionalism, much of
this activity in the area of criminal procedure.11 Its jurisprudence in
state constitutionalism is thus well rehearsed and provides a good
backdrop for this discussion of such state-court decision making.
To begin, my answer to Dean Sager’s question, which I will
briefly outline below and then develop in the balance of this piece,
is that state courts should presumptively defer to the judgment of
the Supreme Court concerning the meaning and scope of a cognate
constitutional norm. The normative protections at issue, both the
two I have selected as well as the others imposed on the states
through the incorporation doctrine, are limited to fundamental val
ues that lie at the core of our justice system. Because in our federal
construct states are neither fully independent nor politically auton
omous, the national meaning of such norms should, at least pre
sumptively, prevail.
But that presumed deference is only an analytic starting point,
and it may give way depending on the nature of the constitutional
norm in question. The two constitutional norms I will examine,
search and seizure and right to counsel, offer not just different pro
tections, but different kinds of protection. The protection against
Assistance, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 53, 67-68 (1996) (tracking the historical connection
between Article 14 and the Fourth Amendment); Joseph A. Grasso, Jr., “John Adams
Made Me Do It”: Judicial Federalism, Judicial Chauvinism, and Article 14 of Massachu
setts’ Declaration of Rights, 77 MISS. L.J. 315, 319-20 (2007) (reviewing this historical
linkage); Herbert P. Wilkins, Judicial Treatment of the Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights in Relation to Cognate Provisions of the United States Constitution, 14 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 887, 928 (1980) [hereinafter Judicial Treatment of the Massachusetts Declara
tion of Rights] (noting “the common source of the principles expressed in [the federal
Bill of Rights and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights]”).
10. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Courts, State Courts, and the Constitution: A
Rejoinder to Professor Redish, 36 UCLA L. REV. 369, 371 (1988).
11. See Grasso, supra note 9 passim (cataloging and discussing this
phenomenon).
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unreasonable search and seizures marks off an area of substantive
protection against governmental, mostly investigative, intrusions;12
that is, the norm itself constitutes a particular liberty interest, un
derstanding “liberty” is understood to mean a personal freedom
that the government may not restrain.13 In contrast, the right to be
represented by counsel in a criminal trial, along with similar rights
such as the right to confront adverse witnesses and the right to a
jury trial, does not stake out and protect a particular area of free
dom from governmental interference.14 Rather, it provides proce
dural protection against the government when it seeks to convict an
individual of a crime and thus to deprive that person of personal
freedom, typically through imprisonment.15 Such a procedural
12. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and ef
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Article 14 of the Declaration of Rights provides:
Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches, and
seizures, of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions. All war
rants, therefore, are contrary to this right, if the cause or foundation of them
be not previously supported by oath or affirmation; and if the order in the
warrant to a civil officer, to make search in suspected places, or to arrest one
or more suspected persons, or to seize their property, be not accompanied
with a special designation of the persons or objects of search, arrest, or seizure:
and no warrant ought to be issued but in cases, and with the formalities pre
scribed by the laws.
MASS. CONST. art. XIV.
13. See Ronald Dworkin, Keynote Address: Justice for Hedgehogs, 90 B.U. L.
REV. 469, 471 (2010) (symposium issue devoted to a conference on Dworkin’s forth
coming book, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS); see also INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITU
TIONS, supra note 6, at 84 (conceptualizing liberty more broadly, as encompassing
affirmative governmental powers as well as particular restraints on those powers neces
sary to promote “public welfare” or “public good”). Building on this broader concept
of liberty, I will suggest that the Fourth Amendment and its state cognate, Article 14,
can be seen as providing and protecting two liberty interests—individual protections
against law-enforcement authority and collective protections promoting public safety—
balancing one against the other. See infra note 151 and accompanying text.
14. The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent part that “[i]n all criminal prose
cutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Article 12 of the Declaration of Rights provides in
pertinent part that “every subject [held to answer for any crime or offence] shall have a
right . . . to be fully heard in his defence by himself, or his council, at his election.”
MASS. CONST. art. XII.
15. “[The Supreme] Court has recognized that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel [is necessary] in order to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial.” Strick
land v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684 (1984).
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norm, though constitutionally enumerated and fundamentally im
portant, does not define a protected liberty interest; instead, it
works with other such norms to protect against wrongful conviction
and the general deprivation of personal liberty that would result.16
This distinction is important to my answer to Dean Sager’s
question for two reasons. First, the liberty interest in freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures constitutes an important sub
stantive part of our nation’s normative separation between legiti
mate governmental activities and personal freedoms with which the
government may not interfere.17 Given the subordinate status of
states in our federal political construct, it simply does not make
sense that a state court should be able to independently redraw this
normative line based on no more than disagreement with the Su
preme Court concerning its location. As one of our nation’s foun
dational principles, this liberty interest should have the same
content across the land. In contrast, state constitutional expansion
of a procedural protection such as the right to counsel does not
disturb the national boundary that marks the content of our liber
ties on the one hand and permissible governmental power on the
other. If anything, the liberty interest that such a procedural norm
protects—freedom from wrongful conviction—would be ratified by
a state’s expansion of the protection beyond that offered by the
Sixth Amendment, thus strengthening rather than undercutting the
uniformity of our nation’s foundational liberty interests.
Even if one regards this uniformity interest as largely symbolic
and is thus prepared to accept state-by-state differences in the con
tent of our nation’s core liberty interests, there is a second theoreti
cal problem with state constitutional expansion of the search-and
seizure norm, again stemming from the subordinate status of states
in our federal system.18 To have a constitution that is worthy of
both the name and treatment as such—that is, a written instrument
adopted by a sovereignty that establishes as a foundational matter
the powers and duties of government as well as the particular limi
tations of governmental power, thereby guaranteeing certain rights

16. Id. at 684.
17. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
18. See James A. Gardner, Whose Constitution Is It? Why Federalism and Consti
tutional Positivism Don’t Mix, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1245, 1254-59 (2005) [hereinaf
ter Whose Constitution Is It?].
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to the people against governmental power19—a state must have suf
ficient independence or autonomy to deliver on the protections it
there guarantees. As I will argue below, there is a serious question
as to whether a state has the political autonomy necessary for its
courts to impose, as a matter of constitutional interpretation, a
state-specific reordering of the search-and-seizure normative man
date.20 In each state, there is significant federal law-enforcement
presence, utilizing officers as well as courts that are not subject to
state constitutional limits on searches and seizures; indeed, this
freedom to ignore state constitutional limits on searches and
seizures can even extend to state and local police in certain circum
stances.21 States are thus in a poor position to guarantee their citi
zens the enhanced protection that a state constitutional expansion
of the search and seizure norm purports to offer. It is therefore
difficult to recognize the sort of state control over the search-and
seizure norm that seems a theoretical predicate for its constitutional
construction and enforcement.22 Again, the same is not true for
procedural protections such as the right to counsel.23 The impact of
those normative protections occurs exclusively within a state’s court
system, an area of undoubted state authority and control.24
Finally, as I will develop, there are practical and prudential
reasons that combine with these two conceptual reasons to counsel
state-court deference to the Supreme Court in interpreting the
search-and-seizure norm but that overcome the presumption of
such deference in interpreting the right-to-counsel norm.
My argument will proceed in two parts. First, I will outline its
doctrinal background, which by now is familiar territory. I will then
turn to the development of my presumption-based approach, begin
ning with its underlying premises and a review of the competing
interpretive theories in state constitutionalism, and concluding with
my norm-specific answers to Dean Sager’s question.

19. This is the positivist, Lockean view of a constitution, an instrument limning
the metes and bounds of the power delegated by “the people” to the government that
these people have come together to form. Id. at 1249-50.
20. See infra Part II.
21. See infra Part II.
22. See TARR, supra note 6, at 173-209.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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DOCTRINAL BACKGROUND

For the first 150 years or so of the Declaration of Rights’ exis
tence, the federal and state constitutions operated on parallel
tracks, the federal Bill of Rights applying only to the federal gov
ernment25 and state constitutions applying to their respective gov
ernments. However, with the post-Civil War enactment of the
Fourteenth Amendment, federal due process protection was ex
panded to apply to state governments and their actors. Over the
next century, reaching its height in the rights revolution of the
1960s, almost all of the federal Bill of Rights were “incorporated”
into the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process protection and thus
became applicable to the states, creating the rights overlap here at
issue.26
This applicability of federal rights to the states caused little
confusion at first.27 The federal rights set the minimum level of
protection that individuals enjoyed against state governments, leav
ing a state court free as a matter of positive law to interpret a state
constitutional provision to provide greater protection than the anal
ogous federal provision.28 But because the Supreme Court that ex
tended those federal rights to the states—for the most part the
Warren Court—also took a broad view of those rights, few if any
state courts were inclined to further extend the protection thus im
posed.29 As a practical matter, the rights revolution of the Warren
Court overwhelmed the states, including Massachusetts, and the
Court led the way in the development of constitutional doctrine in
this area of rights overlap.30
State court interpretive deference to the Supreme Court began
to erode in the 1970s in response to the Court’s retrenchment, first
under Chief Justice Burger and then Chief Justice Rehnquist, re
garding the scope of individual rights.31 Dissatisfied with the nar
rowing of federal constitutional protections, state courts—the
Supreme Judicial Court among them32—began to respond, albeit
25. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247-48 (1833).
26. See TARR, supra note 6, at 181-84.
27. Id. at 183.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 161-65.
30. See Judicial Treatment of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, supra note
9, at 920-21.
31. See TARR, supra note 6 (cataloging this development).
32. As Justice Wilkins observed in 1980:
In recent years, the Supreme Judicial Court has exercised the option to
impose higher state constitutional standards in some instances and, in many
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cautiously in the beginning, with opinions that took a broader view
than did the Supreme Court concerning the scope of particular indi
vidual rights.33 This emergent willingness of state courts to inter
pret state constitutional provisions more broadly than the cognate,
in some cases identical, federal provisions brought on the debate
concerning the legitimacy and wisdom of what could be seen as
state-by-state overrides of applicable federal law.
II. THE QUESTION: DEFERENCE
A.

OR

DISSONANCE?

Underlying Premises

There is no doubt as to the positive-law authority of state
courts, Massachusetts’s Supreme Judicial Court among them, to in
terpret the constitutions of their respective states independent of
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of similar, or even identical,
provisions in the federal Constitution.34 State constitutions provide
that authority limited only by the federal Constitution’s Supremacy
Clause, which requires state court judges to follow federal law
where and as it applies.35 If a particular federal constitutional right
has been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Pro
cess Clause and is thus applicable to the states, state courts are
bound to apply that protection as interpreted by the Supreme
Court, but these mandated federal rights do no more than establish
the minimum protection owed to individuals against state governother instances, without exercising that option, the court has explicitly ac
knowledged its authority to act independently under the state constitution.
While these rumblings are not yet powerful and appear only in certain consti
tutional areas, they are intensifying, suggesting that the personal freedoms of
the Declaration of Rights may be about to receive new attention.
Judicial Treatment of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, supra note 9, at 889-90.
Although Justice Wilkins went on to note what he characterized as the “historical reti
cence” of the Supreme Judicial Court “to alter even judge-made or common law princi
ples,” id. at 890 n.9, his prediction of increased attention on the Declaration of Rights
by the Court has proved prescient. See, for example, Grasso, supra note 9, for a summary and thoughtful critique of search-and-seizure decisions in which the Supreme Ju
dicial Court has interpreted Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights to
provide more protection than the Fourth Amendment.
33. In Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), the Supreme Court acknowledged
that a decision of a state court resting on “adequate and independent [of federal law]
state grounds” is insulated from its review even though the decision is directly contrary
to its decision based on an analogous, or even identical, federal constitutional provision.
The Court in Long stated that this state-ground basis of decision must be “clearly and
expressly” stated to avoid federal review, id. at 1041, a requirement easily satisfied by a
simple statement to that effect.
34. Sager, supra note 1, at 959.
35. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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ment actions.36 State courts are free—again, as a matter of positive
law—to interpret and apply the provisions of their respective state
constitutions that protect those same rights. If the state court inter
prets these protections to be greater than their federal counterparts,
the enhanced state protections prevail.
The challenge, as Dean Sager puts it, is identifying the extent,
if any, to which state courts should defer to the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of a federal constitutional provision in exercising that
authority to expand analogous state constitutional protection be
yond that federal protection.37 Any such deference would flow not
from positive law, but from more amorphous constraints such as the
nature of judicial decision making and judicial responsibility that
inhere in our federal system of democratic government.38 Because
such deference flies in the face of the positive-law authority of state
courts to interpret their respective constitutions, it is fair to put the
burden on one who would limit its exercise based on conceptual
limitations like decisional legitimacy and judicial restraint. How
does my argument meet that burden?
Let me start with some plausible attributes of responsible judi
cial decision making by a state court in our federal system that fea
tures dual enforcement of fundamental norms. This is an issue
which has occupied countless scholars, judges, and lawyers and has
resulted in an immense literature that has yet to yield a consensus,
and I do not pretend here to capture where the matter stands. But
it seems fair at least to say that a state court—particularly one
whose members are appointed and thus insulated from the political
process—should exercise its interpretive authority in a principled
fashion, not as an exercise of political will. That is, constitutional
interpretation should be based on established, plausibly neutral in
terpretive principles. These principles require attention to the text,
history, and underlying intellectual foundation of the provision in
question as well as respect for the limits inherent in judicial decision
making, such as attention to established and ostensibly binding pre
cedent and the doctrine of stare decisis. In short, constitutional in
terpretation should employ the recognized tools of appropriate

36. See, e.g., Randal S. Jeffrey, Equal Protection in the State Courts: The New
Economic Equality Rights, 17 LAW & INEQ. 239, 251 (1999).
37. Sager, supra note 1, at 959.
38. Id. at 960-61.
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judicial decision making as opposed to the unbounded policy-based
decision making that characterizes the legislative process.39
A second premise on which my argument rests flows from the
anomalous nature of state constitutionalism. As Professor James
Gardner has written, the very idea of a subordinate polity like a
state having a constitution is at best odd.40 In the classical positivist
view, constitutions are written instruments adopted by the constitu
ents of an independent sovereignty giving structure and ceding
power to some form of government but imposing particular limita
tions on the exercise of that power against the constituent citi
zenry.41 Given that a state does not enjoy such sovereign autonomy
but rather is a subordinate part of the United States, it is difficult—
at least as a matter of theory—to justify a state’s constitutional
norms displacing those of the nation, imposing limits on elected of
ficials more stringent than those imposed by the cognate national
norms.
Of course, in our federal system, states are not mere regional
departments fully subordinate to the federal government. As Pro
fessor Gardner observes, states are by design partly subordinate to,
but partly independent of, the nation of which they are a part.42
The key, then, is to identify those areas in which a state has suffi
cient independence in our federal construct to substitute its consti
tutional limitations for analogous federal limitations on state
officials directly accountable to the people, thus changing within
that state the normative relationship between the citizens and their
government.
39. See, e.g., Kermit Roosevelt, Polyphonic Stare Decisis: Listening to Non-Article
III Actors, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1303, 1308-09 (2008) (distinguishing judicial au
thority from legislative authority by observing that judicial departures from precedent
require justification in recognized principles); Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case
Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346, 1360 (2006) (arguing that courts have no
demonstrable competency advantage over legislatures in construing constitutionalrights provisions); cf. Richard Fallon, The Core of an Uneasy Case for Judicial Review,
125 HARV. L. REV. 1693, 1716-18 (2008) (conceding that judicial review may lack demo
cratic legitimacy due to its counter-majoritarian nature, but arguing that it promotes
overall governmental legitimacy to the extent that it protects against violations of,
mostly, individual rights).
I certainly do not mean to say that policy has no place in constitutional interpreta
tion. Policy is essential to unlocking the meaning and proper application of the pur
posely indeterminate norms here at issue. But a court’s employment of policy ought to
respect the constraints that inhere in the judicial function.
40. Whose Constitution Is It?, supra note 18, at 1253.
41. See, e.g., INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 6.
42. Whose Constitution Is It?, supra, note 18, at 1254.
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To be clear, I have no doubt that a state legislature may impose
limitations on state officials that extend protections of its citizens
beyond those required by federal constitutional norms. As the gov
ernmental organ elected by and thus politically accountable to the
people, a decision by the legislature to restrict the use of state
power for policy reasons is wholly appropriate. The question here
is the legitimacy of state courts doing so through constitutional
interpretation.
My premise here is straightforward. For a state court to substi
tute its interpretation of a cognate constitutional provision for that
of the Supreme Court, thus increasing a particular limitation on
governmental power vis-a-vis individuals within that state, the
emergent state constitutional norm must be one that will be fully
effective within that state. If there are governmental actors in the
state who may ignore the more protective normative mandate (and
thus state citizens who must suffer the ostensibly forbidden govern
mental conduct), that restructured norm has no claim to constitu
tional status. Quite simply, a norm that governmental actors are
free to disobey cannot be regarded as one of the foundational prin
ciples that limits governmental power within that state. In such a
case, the state (acting through its courts) lacks the sovereign auton
omy necessary to rely on that norm as a constitutional limitation on
its government. In contrast, if a state constitutional interpretation
expanding protection beyond that afforded by the federal cognate
is capable of full enforcement within the state, the state has suffi
cient autonomy to justify such a constitutional mandate.
This insistence on state autonomy as a necessary predicate for
state constitutional expansion of cognate norms is underscored by
recalling that the constitutional protections at issue here are limited
to those that have been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amend
ment’s Due Process Clause.43 The Supreme Court’s criterion for
incorporation is that the norm be “fundamental to our scheme of
ordered liberty and system of justice,”44 one of the “fundamental
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil
and political institutions.”45 The rhetoric may change from case to
43. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3034-35 (2010).
44. See id. at 3032 (citing and quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 &
n.14 (1968), in holding that the Second Amendment’s right to bear arms is incorporated
into the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and thus applicable to the
states).
45. Id. at 3034. Over the years, the Court has described these rights in a variety
of ways, for example, as a “fundamental right, essential to a fair trial,” Gideon v. Wain

\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-1\WNE102.txt

92

unknown

Seq: 12

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

27-SEP-11

11:17

[Vol. 33:81

case, but the idea is the same. Only fundamental rights—essentially
those set forth in the Bill of Rights46—have been imposed through
incorporation on states. So, the cognate state and federal constitu
tional provisions at issue here, which share virtually identical texts,
history and ideological foundations,47 are at bottom no more than
state and federal versions of the same core norms. If a state court is
going to disagree with the Supreme Court concerning the meaning
or reach of such a norm, in effect overruling the Court in that re
gard within its state, at the very least it should be a norm as to
which the state can claim autonomy grounded in its ability fully to
enforce its version of the shared normative command within its bor
ders. Anything short of that risks limitation by constitutional
pretense.
Of course, these premises—even if one accepts them—do not
answer Dean Sager’s question concerning state deference to the Su
preme Court. However, they set the parameters of the discussion
to which I now turn, beginning with the competing theories of state
constitutionalism.
B. Competing Interpretive Theories
Three interpretive approaches have emerged over the years to
deal with this puzzle: the total-deference or so-called lockstepping
approach, the state-primacy approach, and the supplemental or in
terstitial approach.48
1. Lockstepping
The first approach, sometimes called lockstepping,49 reflects a
top-down view of constitutional interpretation. Under this ap
wright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1963) (quoting Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 471 (1942)),
or “a procedure [that] is necessary to an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty,”
Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149-50 n.14. However it is described, the overlap of federal and
state protection here at issue is confined to core normative values embodied in the
federal and state constitutions.
46. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3034-35 & n.13 (noting that “[o]nly a handful of the
Bill of Rights protections remain unincorporated” and listing five: “the Sixth Amend
ment right to a unanimous jury verdict[;] . . . the Third Amendment’s protection against
quartering of soldiers; . . . the Fifth Amendment’s grand jury indictment requirement;
. . . the Seventh Amendment[’s] right to a jury trial in civil cases; and . . . the Eight
Amendment’s prohibition on excessive fines” (citations and numbering omitted)).
47. As noted above, Articles 12 and 14 preceded and served as models for their
federal counterparts. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., TARR, supra note 6, at 180-85.
49. See, e.g., JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDI
VIDUAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS, AND DEFENSES §1.06[2] (4th ed. 2006); TARR, supra note 6, at
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proach, state courts interpreting state constitutional provisions
openly and almost automatically defer to the Supreme Court’s in
terpretation of the federal cognate.50 Such conformity between
state and federal constitutional protections reflects the national
supremacy in the state-federal relationship. Moreover, its emergent
uniform standards are consistent with the notion that constitutional
interpretation flows from law, not judicial preference, which pro
motes at least the appearance of principled decision making.51 That
said,52 this insistence that state constitutions conform jit-for-jit, jotfor-jot to their federal counterpart flies in the face of the dual sov
ereignty that is an essential feature of our federal system. States
may not be wholly independent sovereigns in the sense that a na
tion is, but neither are they mere regional administrative subdivi
sions of our nation.53 And, while our state-federal system of dual
enforcement of constitutional norms is hardly free of conceptual or
practical difficulties, it does provide a mechanism for a more di
verse and robust consideration of the meaning and application of
our nation’s core norms, an advantage that should not be discarded
out of hand.54
2. Primacy Approach
The intuitive alternative to lockstep interpretation is to con
sider a state’s constitution as the primary source of constitutional
protection for its citizens. When responding to a claimed constitu
180-82. Florida went so far as to amend its constitution to require that its search-and
seizure provision “be construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United
States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.” FLA. CONST.
art. I, § 12; see Robert F. Williams, State Courts Adopting Federal Constitutional Doc
trine: Case-By-Case Adoptionism or Prospective Lockstepping?, 46 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1499 (2005) [hereinafter State Courts Adopting Federal Constitutional Doctrine]
(discussing this approach and the question of whether such lockstepping should bind a
state to future Supreme Court interpretations of federal cognates of state constitutional
provisions).
50. TARR, supra note 6, at 180-85.
51. Id.
52. It is easy to overstate these claims. If the status of a constitutional decision as
law depends on its appearance as such, it seems a fragile claim to legitimacy.
53. See, e.g., Whose Constitution Is It?, supra note 18, at 1254 (pointing out that
states are “subnational units . . . partly dependent and partly independent; partly auton
omous and partly subordinate[, with the] subnational unit’s autonomy [possibly] re
stricted territorially or by area of competence, or both”).
54. See, e.g., Abrahamson, supra note 6, at 1181-86 (noting early on in the onset
of state constitutionalism the potential for state-court contributions to constitutional
jurisprudence); State Courts Adopting Federal Constitutional Doctrine, supra note 49
passim.
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tional violation arising from a state constitutional provision and its
federal cognate, primacists argue that a state court should begin
with the state’s version of that provision and employ an interpretive
approach similar to that which has developed in federal constitu
tional interpretation.55 Only if the state provision does not support
the claimed constitutional protection should the state court turn to
the federal provision.56 After all, the reasoning goes, incorporated
federal protections are back-ups that are meant only to supply a
corrective if state law is under-protective.57 To turn first to the fed
eral constitution puts the cart before the horse, which improperly
subordinates the state constitution and undercuts its development
in a system of federalism premised on parallel constitutional
protections.58
If lockstepping is too top-down, leaving too little room for
state constitutional development, this primacy alternative seems too
bottom-up, over-emphasizing the role of state constitutionalism in
our system of overlapping constitutional protections. Given states’
subordinate status in our nation’s political structure, a state court’s
interpretation of a common normative protection that lies at the
heart of our national political values should start, both logically and
conceptually, with the federal constitution,59 which presumptively
sets the national standard. The idea that a state court should in
stead start with its own constitution, the federal constitution serving
only as a back-up, must ultimately rest on the view that each state is
an independent sovereignty, a political co-equal of the nation of
which it is a part, and thus that its constitution must predominate
within its borders, limited only by the Supremacy Clause’s positive
command that applicable federal law cannot be ignored.60 As Pro
fessor Gardner puts it, while there is room in our federal system for
interpretive difference, that is different than full independence.61
55. TARR, supra note 6, at 184-85.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. An early proponent of this primacy theory of interpretation is Professor Hans
Linde, formerly the Chief Justice of the Oregon Supreme Court. See Linde, supra note
6, at 396; TARR, supra note 6, at 183-84.
59. See Whose Constitution Is It?, supra note 18, at 1255 (arguing that “the partial
subordinancy of states in a federal system” significantly limits a “state polity’s agency,
[a] limitation[ ] that [is] severely in tension with the premises of constitutional positiv
ism, especially the requirement of political self-construction”). Simply and obviously
put, states in our federal system are not independent sovereignties with the political
capacity for full self-governance.
60. INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 6, at 84.
61. See Whose Constitution Is It?, supra note 18, at 1265-66.
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There is a practical side to this point as well. When a litigant
claims constitutional protection founded in both the state and fed
eral constitutions, there is no need to go further if the federal provi
sion provides the claimed protection.62 The federal Due Process
Clause that binds the state requires recognition of the claim. The
question of whether the state constitution’s protection is less than,
the same, or greater than that provided by the federal constitution
is quite beside the point, in a word, moot. Moreover, federal consti
tutional doctrine is in all likelihood better developed than its state
counterpart,63 a practical reason to start at this point rather than
beginning at some less developed point in state law. Finally, if the
constitutional issue raised by a claim is unresolved as a federal mat
ter, the state court has the opportunity to participate and be heard
in the development of the federal standard, not as a sideline critic
but as a court duty-bound to interpret and apply the federal consti
tution.64 It is thus not surprising that the primacy approach has not
attracted many adherents among state courts.65
62. See TARR, supra note 6, at 14.
63. As noted, the rights revolution of the Warren Court basically overwhelmed
the states, leading the way in developing a considerable body of constitutional doctrine
in this area of cognate rights. See supra Part I. State courts became accustomed to
following that lead, respectively developing their own precedent concerning federal
rights. See Judicial Treatment of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, supra note 9,
at 920.
64. It is critically important that state courts remain engaged in this area of the
interpretation and application of federal constitutional law. The availability of federal
post-conviction relief has become so narrow that state courts have become critically
important for considering federal constitutional claims in criminal cases tried in state
courts. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1) (2006) (limiting federal habeas corpus review of state-court proceedings to
decisions on the merits that violated “clearly established Federal law, as determined by
the Supreme Court” or that were “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts
in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding”); see also Teague v.
Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (essentially limiting federal habeas corpus review of asserted
state-court constitutional errors to violations of constitutional principles prevailing at
the time the conviction became final); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 362 (2000)
(making it clear that Teague’s limitation of federal habeas corpus review to principles
prevailing at the time of conviction equated to AEDPA’s “clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States”).
65. Oregon, perhaps understandably, as well as Maine and New Hampshire are
among the courts that have taken this approach to interpreting their respective constitu
tions. See TARR, supra note 6, at 184 n.39. The Supreme Judicial Court has at times
claimed allegiance to the primacy approach, but not on any consistent basis. Compare
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 722 N.E.2d 429, 434 (2000) (“As a general rule in decid
ing . . . questions [of search-and-seizure rights], we look first to any applicable statutes,
then to our State Constitution (if argued separately), and only if necessary to the Fed
eral Constitution.”), with Commonwealth v. Martin, 827 N.E.2d 198, 199-200 (Mass.
2005) (looking first to federal law before turning to state law to find the basis for the
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3. Supplemental or Interstitial Approach
Most states have taken a middle ground between lockstep
ping’s automatic deference to the federal constitution and primacy’s
relegation of it to a secondary role, an approach called by some
“supplemental,” by others “interstitial.”66 In this approach, the
state court looks first to the federal version of the cognate provi
sion, and turns only to the state version if the federal provision does
not afford the asserted protection.67
This approach of examining the meaning and application of
common fundamental norms first from the federal perspective
strikes the right balance in our federal system. Its relegation of
state law to an interstitial role may at first seem troubling because
state law only comes into play when the federal right does not pro
vide the claimed protection, which may create the impression that
the turn to the state constitution was driven by disagreement with
the Supreme Court more than anything else.68 This appearance of
result-oriented jurisprudence is exacerbated by the resulting body
of state-constitutional law, which due to its limited, interstitial use
may turn out to be a relatively narrow, disconnected set of prece
dents that quite often reflect policy disagreements with contrary Su
preme Court decisions,69 effectively over-ruling those federal
decisions within that state.70
claimed right); Commonwealth v. Mavredakis, 725 N.E.2d 169, 176-77 (Mass. 2000)
(same); Commonwealth v. Smith, 593 N.E.2d 1288, 1291-93 (Mass. 1992) (same). See
generally Grasso, supra note 9 (demonstrating that notwithstanding its claim to the primacy approach in Rodriguez, the Supreme Judicial Court often employs the supple
mental approach in addressing search-and-seizure issues under Article 14).
66. See TARR, supra note 6, at 182-83.
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., id. at 183; In the Glare of the Supreme Court, supra note 6, at 1044,
1047-49, 1063.
69. Of course, this is not necessarily so. To be sure, under this approach the court
will not, or at least should not, consider the state’s constitution if the federal provision
provides the claimed relief. But even if the court does turn to the state provision be
cause the federal version of the right provides no relief, the court may determine that
the state right is no more protective than the federal cognate. This alignment of the
state version of the norm with its federal counterpart, called by some “reflective adop
tion,” see, e.g., State Courts Adopting Federal Constitutional Doctrine, supra note 49, at
1506-08, is properly a part of the supplemental approach unless one assumes that a state
court that interprets its own constitution does so only if it is bent on rights expansion.
This is not lockstep if that term means, as it suggests, necessarily tethering the state
version of a norm to its federal cognate.
70. See, e.g., Hans Linde, E Pluribus–Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18
GA. L. REV. 165, 178 (1984); In the Glare of the Supreme Court, supra note 6, at 1047
49.
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In an apparent effort to avoid this impression of decisional ille
gitimacy, some state courts have gone out of their way to identify
the independent bases on which their state-constitutional decisions
rest. This interpretive approach typically parallels federal constitu
tional analysis by examining the text of the provision and intent of
its framers as well as the state’s precedents, history, and unique tra
ditions or political values to find support for a decision that the
state provision is different and offers broader protection than its
federal counterpart.71 Some courts have even developed specific
criteria to guide their divergence from federal precedent in an ef
fort to avoid the temptations—or the appearance—of result-ori
ented decision making.72
This is overcompensation that is not only unnecessary but
doomed to failure.73 There may be principled reasons for a state
court to find different, more protective meaning for a common
norm and to impose its version of that norm within its state, but it is
almost never because the state and federal provisions have signifi
cantly different text74 or distinct intellectual and historical roots.
71. See TARR, supra note 6, at 183 & n.36; see, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Mavredakis, 725 N.E.2d 169, 178 (Mass. 2000) (citing differing text and history of the
Fifth Amendment and Article 12 of the Declaration of Rights as a justification for
broader reading of Article 12’s protection against compelled self-incrimination).
72. See, e.g., State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 965-67 (N.J. 1982) (Handler, J., concur
ring) (setting out the following seven factors to measure the legitimacy of the New
Jersey Supreme Court relying on its state constitution supplementally to expand rights
recognized in both the federal and state constitutions: (1) textual language; (2) legisla
tive history; (3) pre-existing state law; (4) structural differences; (5) matters of particu
lar state interest or local concern; (6) state traditions; and (7) public attitudes); see also
Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 895 & n.7 (Pa. 1991); State v. Gunwall, 720
P.2d 808, 812-13 (Wash. 1986); In the Glare of the Supreme Court, supra note 6, at 1046
55 (criticizing the criteria approach as subordinating state constitutions to the federal
constitution).
73. See James Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH.
L. REV. 761 (1992).
74. There are, of course, some textual differences—even in constitutions that pre
date the federal constitution—that convey different meaning. For example, Article 12
of the Declaration or Rights provides not just for the right to confront a prosecution
witness in a criminal trial, but the right for “face-to-face” confrontation, thus explicitly
providing for more protection than does the Sixth Amendment. Compare Common
wealth v. Amirault, 677 N.E.2d 652, 660-62 (Mass. 1997) (holding that Article 12’s ex
plicit requirement of “face-to-face” confrontation requires just that and that a
courtroom seating arrangement which at best permitted the defendant to see only the
profiles of child witnesses whom he was accused of raping violated that requirement),
with Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 849-50, 857 (1990) (holding that the Sixth Amend
ment does not in every case require face-to-face confrontation and that where necessary
to protect a child witness from trauma its absence does not violate the Sixth Amend
ment’s confrontation clause).
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That is certainly so in a state like Massachusetts, whose Declaration
of Rights served as a model for the federal Bill of Rights.75 Even in
states with less direct ties between their respective constitutions and
the federal cognate, resting different meaning on a claim of distinct
language, history, and intellectual roots is an empty claim. We are,
after all, the same people, and regional differences—ideological
and otherwise—have all but disappeared in the face of the everincreasing mobility and homogenation of our society.76 When this
cultural and political convergence is coupled with the fact that the
rights provisions of the federal and the various state constitutions
generally have common historical and intellectual roots, articulating
common, national norms, the idea that—based on the conventional
interpretive tools of text, history, and fundamental values—a rights
provision of a state constitution might be sufficiently distinct from
75. Even so, the Supreme Judicial Court seems on occasion to suggest this inde
pendence as a basis for its state-constitutional decision making. See, e.g., Mavredakis,
725 N.E.2d at 178 (citing the differing language and history of the Fifth Amendment
and Article 12 as one of the justifications for more broadly reading Article 12’s protec
tion against compelled self-incrimination than that of the Fifth Amendment). See gen
erally Roderick L. Ireland, How We Do It in Massachusetts: An Overview of How the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Has Interpreted its State Constitution to Address
Contemporary Legal Issues, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 405 (2004). Then-Justice, now Chief
Justice Ireland’s review of the Supreme Judicial Court’s interpretive methodology in
state constitutionalism describes a supplemental approach utilizing the conventional in
terpretive tools of history, text, precedent, and policy judgments informed by distinct
regional history and culture. Id. But see Judicial Treatment of the Massachusetts Decla
ration of Rights, supra note 9, at 889-91 (describing an early methodology, a supplemental approach characterized by “a strong tradition of judicial restraint” exhibiting
deference both to “the lead of the United States Supreme Court” and particularly “leg
islative determinations”) and cases cited and described.
In a review of the Supreme Judicial Court’s state-constitution jurisprudence twenty
years later, Justice Wilkins described a court more willing to disagree with its national
counterpart (particularly on Fourth Amendment issues), relying on
[progressive state] traditions and a state Constitution that expresses concepts
of reasonableness and fairness that should be reapplied as society changes . . .
[to] justif[y] an independent and different conclusion on a constitutional issue
by judges who are sworn to uphold not only the United States Constitution
but also the Constitution of the Commonwealth.
Herbert P. Wilkins, The State Constitution Matters, 44 BOSTON B. J. 4, 17 (Dec. 2000)
[hereinafter The State Constitution Matters].
76. It is not that we cannot tell one strip mall from another as we drive crosscountry or that our local broadcasters all speak with the same accent, but that the dual
identity of state and federal citizenry long ago blurred, leaving the cultural and political
constant that we are not Virginians, Californians. or Arkansans, but Americans who
might live in Virginia, California, or Arkansas. This disappearance of any felt cultural
and ideological autonomy of the states—that a state is constituted in a way that is fun
damentally different than the rest of the nation—has contributed to the erosion of via
ble state constitutional positivism. See Whose Constitution Is It?, supra note 18, at 1254.
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the similar provision of the federal constitution to be interpreted
differently seems nothing short of a fantasy.77 Professor James
Gardner calls this analytic approach the “[d]ead [e]nd of [r]omantic
[s]ubnationalism,”78 and that seems a fair assessment.
In our federal system, state constitutionalism must be intersti
tial, its proper role being to supplement the protection provided by
the federal version of our nation’s basic norms.79 The state-consti
tutional law that develops can never be the seamless comprehensive
doctrine characteristic of an independent sovereignty’s constitu
tional jurisprudence, nor should it be. In this area of constitutional
overlap, state-constitutional law is by nature a gap-filler, a correc
tive, not a primary source of constitutional protection. When, then,
is such gap-filling, such correction appropriate and when is defer
ence to the content of the federal norm the better course? This, of
course, is Dean Sager’s question, which we can now attempt to
answer.
C. The Operative Content of Appropriate Deference
Asking when deference is appropriate recognizes, of course,
that federal supremacy over the states does not require unfailing
state-court deference to the Supreme Court concerning the mean
ing and application of a fundamental national norm.80 That is so
even though, as developed above, conventional constitutional anal
ysis, with its focus on text, history, and ideological context, helps
little here due to the substantial identity of the state and federal
norms in question. But that underlying identity of norms does not
compel the conclusion that two related versions, even textually
identical versions, of a particular norm must yield a consensus as to
its meaning in every context and application. These are purposely
spacious, indeterminate mandates—here, freedom from unreasona
ble searches and seizures, the right to counsel in a criminal prosecu
tion—that are fairly subject to more than one interpretation.
Common words and history do not necessarily dictate common
meaning. That said, our interpretive context is not a philosophical
inquiry in which we write on a blank tablet. Rather, this interpre
tive effort occurs in a settled political construct in which the fifty
states are not independent sovereignties but constituent parts of a
77.
78.
79.
80.

See INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 6, at 53-79.
Id. at 53.
Sager, supra note 1, at 973-76.
Id. at 973.
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sovereign nation. On what principled basis, then, may a state court
decline to defer to the Supreme Court concerning the meaning of
such a basic norm?
1. State Courts as “Agents of Federalism,” Monitoring the
Supreme Court
One approach would be to acknowledge state-court policybased dissonance concerning the meaning and reach of common
norms and to embrace it as a healthy aspect of the unique statenation relationship inherent in our federal system.81 Professor
Gardner advances this position, arguing that the federal system,
with its overlapping state and federal authority, has as its primary
purpose the protection of its citizens’ liberty.82 In effect, Professor
Gardner argues, the national and state governments act as monitors
of one another, each designed to resist instances of potential over
reaching by its respective counterpart.83 In this view, state courts
are supposed to interpret state law, including state constitutions, to
resist the Supreme Court’s interpretation of a cognate federal pro
vision if the state court concludes that the federal interpretation of
the norm could result in an undue assertion of governmental power
within the state.84
This approach turns the apparent vice of independent state
constitutional analysis into its principal virtue. Recognizing that
conventional state constitutional analysis is a doomed enterprise,
providing thin cover for what at bottom is a policy difference with
the Supreme Court concerning the meaning or reach of a common
norm, Professor Gardner embraces such policy-based resistance as
a viable tool for state courts to use in their role as watch dogs
(“agents of federalism” in his words)85 protecting the people
against national government overreaching.86 The overlapping but
potentially disparate rights-protection by the state and national
81. INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 6, at 18-19.
82. Id. Some have taken issue with this description of federalism, arguing that it
is unduly narrow. See Jim Rossi, The Puzzle of State Constitutions, 54 BUFF. L. REV.
211, 226-28 (2008). That may be, but in the area of criminal procedure it seems an apt
construct.
83. INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 6, at 18-19.
84. Id. at 181-82.
85. Id. at 186-87.
86. Id.
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governments in this view operates as a vertical system of checks and
balances, protecting the liberty interests of the people.87
This is an elegant construct and does much to address the con
cerns for decisional legitimacy that haunt state constitutional analy
sis. But it does so by recognizing a presumption that state courts
have open-ended authority to enhance fundamental normative pro
tections through the state constitution to protect the liberty inter
ests of the state’s citizens. In effect, this presumes away the
subordinate status of states in this area of conflicting state and fed
eral interpretations of common normative values. As Professor
Gardner concedes, state courts do not have a general mandate in
our federal system to engage in unfettered oversight of the Su
preme Court and thus to construct a competing constitutional com
mon law.88 The authority of the state court so to act must be
grounded in state law,89 likely the constitution of the state in
question.
But, as Professor Gardner acknowledges, no state constitution
explicitly authorizes its courts to overrule the Supreme Court con
cerning the breadth of a particular right articulated in both the fed
eral and state constitutions.90 He further concedes that some state
constitutions may authorize a judicial role that is too narrow to per
mit this sort of activism, a narrowness perhaps founded in distrust
of judicial decision making that is apparent from the text, history,
or other tools of constitutional construction.91 Gardner bases this
presumed state court authority on the central role that courts play
in the liberty maximization lying at the heart of our federal sys
tem.92 This aspect of judicial review, he argues, is so integral to our
constitutional system that one who would deny that role for a par
87. Id. at 195-98. Although the focus of this Article is individual rights, Professor
Gardner does not limit this notion of checks and balances to rights protection but ex
tends it to structural issues as well. Id. at 187-94.
88. Id. at 181-82.
89. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983). A state legislature could,
of course, enact a statute providing greater protection to individuals than does a federal
constitutional provision, but a legislature has undoubted political authority to speak for
the state’s citizens in that regard. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 1 (2008) (limit
ing the scope of a search incident to arrest to “fruits, instrumentalities, contraband and
other evidence of the crime for which the arrest has been made, in order to prevent its
destruction or concealment; and removing any weapons that the arrestee might use to
resist arrest or effect his escape”).
90. INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 6, at 228-29.
91. Id. at 245-53.
92. Id. at 243-45.
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ticular state court has the burden to show that the state’s constitu
tion forbids it.93
This presumption reorders the nation-state relationship. Infer
ior state courts become the presumptive final arbiters of the mean
ing and scope of fundamental national norms, potentially
balkanizing the meaning and scope of the normative boundaries
that lie at the heart of our common political values. This reordering
becomes all the more clear when one asks, on what basis should a
state court exercise its presumed prerogative as an agent of federal
ism to expand a common, core right within its state? Professor
Gardner would leave it to the state court, acting as a presumptive
agent of federalism, to identify those Supreme Court decisions that
unduly threaten a particular individual right to be free of govern
mental interference. As attractive as Professor Gardner’s answer to
Dean Sager’s question may seem, in the end it affords too much
open-ended discretion to state courts, coming close to reducing the
Supreme Court to just another supreme court.
2. Presumption of Uniform Meaning
Rather than presuming, as Professor Gardner does, the across
the-board legitimacy of state court expansions of our core norma
tive protections in the name of liberty maximization, a norm-spe
cific approach makes more sense. The nation’s supremacy over its
constituent parts justifies starting with a presumption of state-court
deference to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of fundamental
norms, but this presumption should give way when state-by-state
adjustments of particular fundamental norms is consistent both con
ceptually and practically with our federal construct.
In deciding when that is so, one must begin with the underlying
constitutional interests at stake. All criminal-procedure protections
ultimately protect liberty, which as Ronald Dworkin puts it, “is that
part of freedom that government would do wrong to restrain.”94
But the liberty interests respectively protected by the search-and
93. Id. Justice Wilkins in his more recent review of the Supreme Judicial Court’s
state constitutional jurisprudence, would find such a mandate in what he calls the
[progressive state] traditions and a state Constitution that expresses concepts
of reasonableness and fairness that should be reapplied as society changes . . .
[to] justif[y] an independent and different conclusion on a constitutional issue
by judges who are sworn to uphold not only the United States Constitution
but also the Constitution of the Commonwealth.
The State Constitution Matters, supra note 75, at 17.
94. Dworkin, supra note 13, at 471.
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seizure and right-to-counsel norms are different not only in content
but in kind. Take the right to counsel.95 It does not stake out a
particular activity—a “freedom” in Dworkin’s terms—“that [the]
government would do wrong to restrain.”96 Rather, along with fa
miliar rights such as the right of a criminally accused to a jury trial
and to confront witnesses against him, it offers procedural protec
tion against wrongful conviction97 and the loss of personal freedom,
a cognizable liberty interest, that would ensue. My argument is that
these sorts of procedural protections, imposed on the states both
through the federal Bill of Rights98 and through state constitutions,
generally overcome the presumption of state-court deference to the
Supreme Court.
State constitutional expansion of a procedural protection such
as the right to counsel works no change on the nation’s normative
boundary that marks out constitutional liberties and protects them
from governmental restraint. The protected liberty interest is free
dom from conviction and imprisonment without due process, that
is, wrongful conviction, and that core interest is, if anything, ratified
rather than disturbed by enhancing such procedural protections.
Further, these procedural rights are integrally tied to the adjudica
tive process and thus are essentially local in their impact, having full
effect within but none beyond a state’s court system. The state thus
has exclusive dominion and control over these normative protec
tions, giving it a strong claim to the political autonomy that is the
conceptual predicate to their constitutional construction by its
courts.
95. The Sixth Amendment in pertinent part provides: “[i]n all criminal prosecu
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also People v. Cain, 556 N.E. 2d 141, 143 (N.Y.
1990) (defendants have “a right to be present, with counsel, at all material stages of a
trial”).
96. Dworkin, supra note 13, at 471.
97. Here I use “wrongful conviction” to mean a conviction inconsistent with due
process, not conviction of an innocent. Though conviction of an innocent would surely
be wrongful as a moral matter, to date at least, the Supreme Court has yet to hold that
there is a substantive due process right to an acquittal if one is innocent. Whether so
confining due process in this context to procedural protections is “right” or not is be
yond the scope of this Article. I will proceed on what I understand is the current state
of normative protections in this area to be, that is, wholly procedural.
98. This is admittedly an overstatement, but not by much. The Eight Amend
ment’s right to a grand jury has not been incorporated, see Hurtado v. California, 110
U.S. 516, 534-35 (1884), nor has the Sixth Amendment’s right to a unanimous jury ver
dict, see McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3034-35, n.13 (2010). However,
the rest of the safeguards designed to protect against wrongful convictions have been
incorporated and are thus applicable to the states.
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From a prudential standpoint, this inherent connection to the
adjudicative process supports the decisional legitimacy of the
courts—based on institutional competence and expertise—in gaug
ing the effectiveness of such norms in protecting against a wrongful
conviction. Moreover, judges insulated from the political process
are likely in the best position to fairly assess the procedural protec
tions afforded to those accused of crimes, a cohort that does not
typically enjoy much political support.99
Lavallee v. Justices in the Hampden Superior Court,100 decided
by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in 2004, illustrates the
point. There the Supreme Judicial Court held under Article 12 of
the Declaration of Rights that the right to counsel requires not only
the presence of counsel at bail and detention hearings,101 but more
broadly the appointment and presence of counsel in every criminal
case by or reasonably soon after arraignment.102 In so holding, the
court went beyond Supreme Court interpretations of the Sixth
Amendment concerning the reach of the right to counsel, and an
examination of the court’s analysis demonstrates that this lack of
interpretive deference was wholly justified.103
The Supreme Judicial Court’s interpretive approach did not
rest on differing text or history of the two provisions. Like many
cognate constitutional provisions, both the Sixth Amendment and
Article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights provide for
this normative protection in essentially identical terms.104 That is
no surprise because the Declaration of Rights served as a model for
the Bill of Rights.105 For its part, the Supreme Court has inter
preted the federal version of this right to provide for clear but spare
normative baselines, holding, most notably in Gideon v. Wain
wright, that indigent persons accused of crimes, at least those in
volving any likelihood of incarceration, are entitled to
99. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 39, at 1709 (asserting “that courts are likely to
have a perspective that may make them more sensitive than legislatures to some possi
ble rights violations” due in part to “judges’ professional training and mission [that]
involves a solicitude for rights as they have historically been understood”).
100. Lavallee v. Justices in Hampden Superior. Ct., 812 N.E.2d 895 (Mass. 2004).
101. Id. at 900-01.
102. Id. at 903.
103. Id.
104. The Sixth Amendment in pertinent part provides: “[i]n all criminal prosecu
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Article 12, in pertinent part, provides: “[a]nd every
subject [held to answer for any crime or offense] shall have a right . . . to be fully heard
in his defence by himself, or his council, at his election.” MASS. CONST. art. XII.
105. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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representation by appointed counsel.106 While the Court went on
to hold that the Sixth Amendment requires not just counsel in some
formal sense, but effective assistance of counsel,107 it is fair to say
that the Court has not been aggressive in expanding the right to
counsel, leaving plenty of “untiled space,” to return to Dean Sager’s
expression, beyond these baselines.
This minimalist approach may well have been intentional, de
ferring to the states as a matter of comity to round out the protec
tion as best makes sense in the particular context of each state’s
adjudicative procedures. Over thirty years ago, Dean Sager argued
that such purposeful under-enforcement of constitutional norms by
the Supreme Court is appropriate for institutional reasons, includ
ing comity, leaving it for the states to expand, or not, these norma
tive protections.108 That may lay behind the relatively thin texture
of the Court’s right-to-counsel jurisprudence.
The Court has thus held under the Sixth Amendment that
while the right to counsel attaches when the prosecution begins,109
the right does not entitle an accused to the appointment—much less
the presence and advice—of counsel until a “critical stage” of the
proceedings.110 According to the Court, such “critical stages” of
the proceedings are those “that amount to ‘trial-like confronta
tions,’ at which counsel would help the accused ‘in coping with legal
problems or . . . meeting his adversary.’”111 While it is surely true
that counsel’s presence and advice during such adversarial confron
tations is critical, limiting counsel’s role to such confrontations ig
nores the equally important role that counsel plays in developing an
effective defense. Yet, that is where the Court left the matter.
What if a state court, as a matter of cost-saving or necessity,
does not appoint attorneys to represent indigent defendants until
well after arraignment? Is arraignment or the period that follows
arraignment a “critical stage” requiring the presence of an ap
106. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963).
107. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 377 (1986); Strickland v. Wash
ington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984).
108. See Lawrence Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Con
stitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1221, 1248 (1978) [hereinafter Fair Measure].
109. See McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991) (holding the right to coun
sel attaches when “a prosecution is commenced”); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689
(1972) (holding that a prosecution is commenced “at . . . the initiation of adversary
judicial criminal proceedings—whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing,
indictment, information, or arraignment”).
110. See Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 211-13 (2008).
111. Id. at 212 n.16 (internal citations omitted).
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pointed attorney? If it is, does the failure to appoint counsel during
that period violate an indigent accused’s right to counsel categori
cally or only upon a showing of actual harm? These are questions
that the Supreme Court has left open under the Sixth Amend
ment,112 and they lay at the heart of Lavallee.
In the run-up to Lavallee, the Massachusetts Superior Court
sitting in Hampden County found itself with an insufficient number
of qualified lawyers willing to accept indigent appointments due to
what all agreed was a very low rate of legislatively authorized com
pensation.113 As a result, many unrepresented “indigent . . . de
fendants . . . [were] held [preventively] or in lieu of bail,” and they
petitioned for declarative relief authorizing the trial courts to order
compensation at a higher rate, one which would attract qualified
lawyers in sufficient numbers to provide assistance of counsel to
indigent defendants at the early stages of the proceedings.114 Of
course, any such declarative relief would rest on a right to counsel
that substantively entitled Lavallee and his fellow petitioners to
such representation.
In its ruling, the Supreme Judicial Court relied on Article 12 to
enhance the federal protection limned by the Supreme Court, hold
ing that irrespective of any showing of actual harm, the right to
counsel requires not only the presence of counsel at any bail or
preventive detention hearing115 but more broadly the appointment
and presence of counsel in every case by, or reasonably soon after,
arraignment.116 This state constitutional expansion of the right to
counsel was both theoretically and prudentially appropriate.
112. Id. at 212 (reaffirming that the right to counsel attaches at arraignment, de
fined there as the defendant’s initial appearance before a magistrate, but declining fur
ther to decide whether arraignment is a “critical stage” requiring the presence of
counsel or, if it is, whether the criminal defendant must show harm in order to claim a
violation if counsel was not then present).
113. Lavallee v. Justices in Hampden Superior Ct., 812 N.E.2d 895, 899-900
(Mass. 2004).
114. Id. at 900.
115. Id. at 903.
116. Id. at 903-06. The court declined to authorize the requested increase in at
torney compensation, principally out of respect for the separation of powers and the
legislature’s appropriation authority. Id. at 907-09. While urging the executive and leg
islative branches to craft a permanent solution, as interim relief, the court ordered that
“on a showing that no counsel is available to represent a particular . . . defendant de
spite good faith efforts, such a defendant may not be held more than seven days and the
criminal case against such a defendant may not continue beyond forty-five days.” Id. at
901.
The court could have grounded its holding in the Sixth Amendment, in effect flesh
ing out the federal version of this common, fundamental normative protection. The
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First, the state court’s refinement of this procedural right did
not disturb the national contours of constitutional liberty. The lib
erty interest at stake was avoiding wrongful conviction, and the
court’s intent was explicitly to protect that interest in the context of
the state’s procedures for adjudicating criminal cases.117 So, the
court’s unequivocal requirement that counsel be present through
out the post-arraignment stage of the process, even though under
the federal version of the right this may not be a “critical stage”
requiring such presence, was explicitly a function of Massachusetts
procedure and the issues under that procedural system that an ac
cused is required to address.118 The court pointed out that under
Massachusetts’s Rules of Criminal Procedure, a defendant must file
a pretrial conference report within twenty-one days of arraign
ment.119 In this report a defendant sets forth his decisions on criti
cal issues such as whether to present particular defenses and
memorializes his and the prosecution’s respective discovery obliga
tions. Further, within seven days of filing the conference report,120
a defendant must decide which pretrial-motions if any he wishes to
file and then draft and file them.121 Each of these steps is critically
important to mounting an effective defense, and the advice of coun
sel, founded on a full investigation and understanding of the case,
seems here essential.
As a matter of decisional autonomy, there could not be a more
state-specific normative protection than the right to counsel, at least
that part of the right that affects the post-investigation adjudication
of a criminal case.122 Its impact is by definition confined to the
court is surely authorized, indeed obligated where necessary to resolve a claim, to inter
pret and apply that federal constitutional provision, but it chose instead to decide the
case under Article 12’s right-to-counsel provision. While the Sixth Amendment would
have given the court a voice in the development of the federal right, given the nature of
the claims, the need for finality, and the potential implications for the coordinate
branches of government, it seems a better choice for the court to have founded its
decision in state-constitutional law.
117. Id. (stating that the deprivation “resulted in severe restrictions on their lib
erty and other constitutional interests”).
118. Id. at 904.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. There is another aspect to this right, which is providing an interface, once
criminal proceedings have begun, for meeting and communicating with the accused’s
adversary, i.e., the government. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205-06
(1964). As to this aspect of the right to counsel, where the normative protections ex
tend beyond the courtroom and its procedures, the state-constitutional analysis may be
a little different.
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state’s pretrial, trial, and post-trial proceedings;123 it has no impact
on the similar proceedings of federal courts within the state or the
courts of other states. And, there is no doubt that the state through
its courts can implement an enhanced version of this normative pro
tection, forcing, if necessary, its state actors—prosecutors, police of
ficers, and so on—to comply. Given the confinement of the right to
counsel to a state and its actors coupled with the state’s ability to
enforce the right’s protective mandate on those actors, states
through their courts have the sovereign autonomy that is a predi
cate to constitutional construction of the right to counsel under
their respective state constitutions.
From a prudential perspective, the court’s experience and ex
pertise in the adjudication of criminal cases and its institutional pre
rogative to superintend this process seem beyond question,124 thus
supporting its claim to institutional competence and decisional le
gitimacy in crafting this state constitutional enhancement of the
right-to-counsel protections.125 And, while the national template
for this right was, and remains, open to similar development, it is
not clear that it should be, given the jurisdiction-specific reasons for
the court’s carefully crafted and quite particular holding.126 Per
haps it is better to leave such filling-in of this “untiled” constitu
tional space to each state, with the national version of the norm

123. See, e.g., Lavallee, 812 N.E.2d at 901.
124. In this regard, it seems worth noting that the justice who wrote the decision,
Justice Francis Spina, was particularly well suited to the task, having served as a prose
cutor and criminal defense attorney for many years prior to his appointment to the
bench. Supreme Judicial Court, Francis X. Spina, Mass.gov (Mar. 1, 2011, 1:30pm),
http://www.mass.gov/courts/sjc/justices/spina.html. He also served as a Superior Court
judge, where he presided over many, many criminal cases, before his appointment first
to the Commonwealth’s Appeals Court and then to the Supreme Judicial Court. Id. If
anyone understands how the Massachusetts criminal justice process works, it is Justice
Spina.
125. One might complain that the court should have utilized the less drastic and
more mutable powers of superintendence to accomplish this result. There is often
much to be said for such institutional self-restraint in judicial decision making, leaving
open a role for the legislature and a door for future adjustment if future conditions
suggest it. See, e.g., Judicial Treatment of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, supra
note 9, at 889. However, this particular case, rubbing up against the legislative appropriation prerogative while implicating the core of the fundamental right-to-counsel pro
tection, called out for a definitive resolution, and the state-constitutional basis for the
decision seems entirely appropriate. If the state actors with the direct power to craft a
permanent solution to this problem held back, the court had staked out the basis for a
more direct and drastic remedy.
126. Lavallee, 812 N.E.2d at 901.
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providing its broad baselines.127 However that question may be an
swered, the Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in Lavallee illustrates
why independent state constitutionalism can make sense even when
the protection in question is a fundamental norm common to both
the state’s and the nation’s constitutions.
So, too, it would seem for other rights that offer procedural
protections for the individual liberty interest in avoiding wrongful
conviction and incarceration, at least those rights such as the right
to a jury trial and the right to confront witnesses, which provide
their respective procedural protections once the criminal proceed
ing has begun. Each such right is confined in its effect to the state’s
adjudicative process, which is a sector of the state’s governmental
processes about which the courts have an undoubted claim to ex
pertise and decisional legitimacy and over which they exercise full
control. As to these fundamental rights, the presumption of inter
pretive deference to the Supreme Court is overcome, and state con
stitutional expansion of their protection is appropriate.
The same cannot be said for the Fourth Amendment’s and Ar
ticle 14’s norm protecting against unreasonable searches and
seizures. For reasons both conceptual and prudential, the presump
tion of national uniformity should hold in this situation, counseling
state-court deference to the Supreme Court concerning the content
of this normative protection.
The protection against unreasonable searches and seizures is
not a procedural right that protects an underlying liberty interest.
The norm itself marks the boundary between freedom from particu
lar investigative intrusions and constitutionally permissible law en
forcement conduct. While enhancing a procedural right such as the
right to counsel marks no change in the contours of our nation’s
core liberties, any adjustment to the search-and-seizure balance
changes the normative boundary that defines the respective liberty
and governmental interests in this important area of governmental
interface with its citizenry. If a state court works such an adjust
ment under its constitution, it does not just ratchet up the procedu
127. I do not overlook that the Sixth Amendment provides the only constitu
tional right-to-counsel protection in the federal courts. But in limning its bounds, the
Supreme Court presumably is mindful of the protections in this regard afforded by
federal statutes and the federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which are of course
promulgated by the Court with the assent of Congress. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071, 2074
(2006). The Court can thus afford a minimalist approach to the constitutional protec
tion, keeping an eye on the Rules and statutes to plug any apparent holes in the federal
system.
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ral protection of an underlying liberty interest common to the states
and the nation; it creates a different balance of constitutional inter
ests within that state, giving rise to the possibility of a state-by-state
patchwork of protection, drained of the normative force that na
tional consensus provides. Even if constitutional dissonance does
not reach that level, state constitutional adjustments of the search
and-seizure balance undercut the uniform meaning one would ex
pect in a fundamental, national norm.
From the perspective of decisional or sovereign autonomy,
there is a serious question as to a state’s ability effectively to impose
constitutionally enhanced search-and-seizure protection. The
search-and-seizure protection is directed principally at governmen
tal law enforcement, and both federal and state law-enforcement
agents operate within each state, sometimes side-by-side, enforcing
federal and state versions of what are essentially the same crimes.128
When a state seeks to impose more demanding search-and-seizure
protections, the overlapping system of dual law enforcement signifi
cantly undercuts the force of such additional protections. Federal
officers ordinarily are not bound by the state limits, even if the mat
ter under investigation results in a state court prosecution.129 State
officers are similarly not subject to more stringent state protections
when they are a participating in a federal investigation, again even
if the matter is ultimately tried in state court.130 And, of course,
128. The facts underlying Commonwealth v. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d 356 (Mass.
2009), discussed below, provide a typical example. Connolly was convicted in Massa
chusetts Superior Court of trafficking in cocaine (124.31 grams) in violation of MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 32E(b)(3) (2008) (punishing possession of between 100 and 200
grams of cocaine with intent to distribute by imprisonment for not less than ten years
and not more than twenty years) and distribution of cocaine (three grams) in violation
of MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 32A(c) (2008) (punishing distribution of cocaine in any
amount by imprisonment for up to ten years). See Connolly, 913 N.E.2d at 374. Con
nolly could have been charged and tried in federal court for the same conduct. See 21
U.S.C. § 841A(a)(b)(1)(C) (2006) (punishing the distribution of cocaine in any amount
and possession of cocaine in any amount with intent to distribute by imprisonment up
to twenty years). Under the respective state and federal statutes, not taking into ac
count the respective sentencing guidelines in the two jurisdictions or applicable fines in
each, Connolly thus faced thirty years in state prison and forty years in federal prison
for the two counts. In the event, he was prosecuted only in state court. See Connolly,
913 N.E.2d at 360.
129. See Commonwealth v. Cryer, 689 N.E.2d 808 (Mass. 1998) (general rule plus
collective enterprise exception); Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 688 N.E.2d 455 (Mass.
1997) (same).
130. See Gonzalez, 688 N.E.2d at 458 (holding that absent a state-federal “com
bined enterprise,” which had as its purpose bringing a state prosecution, in which “State
officials retained more authority over the investigation,” or in which “[s]tate involve
ment [had] been more substantial,” evidence seized in violation of Article 14 but consis
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state constitutional protections are not recognized in federal court
no matter who conducted the investigation,131 creating an opportu
nity for forum shopping in those cases in which both federal and
state law criminalize the conduct in question. So, while a more de
manding state version of the search-and-seizure norm would have
considerable impact on criminal investigation practices in a state,
the ability of both state and federal officers to opt out of the state’s
more demanding search-and-seizure protection in investigating a
broad range of cases—e.g., drug and gun cases in which searches
and seizures are almost always employed—significantly reduces the
state’s claim to constitutional autonomy with respect to this norm.
Simply put, there is too much seepage, eroding the sovereign con
trol of the norm on which interpretive autonomy must rest.132
Commonwealth v. Connolly,133 a case recently decided by the
Supreme Judicial Court, serves as a useful example. At issue was
whether police installation and monitoring of a global positioning
system (GPS) device on Connolly’s car constituted a “search” or a
“seizure,” thus subjecting this investigative technique to the search
and-seizure norm’s reasonableness requirement.134 The Supreme
Judicial Court decided as a state constitutional matter that such
GPS surveillance constituted a “seizure” of Connolly’s car and thus
required a warrant to be lawful.135
The Supreme Court has yet to consider the issue,136 but it is
entirely plausible that the Court, or until that happens, the First
tent with the Fourth Amendment is not subject to exclusion in state prosecutions); see
also Commonwealth v. Brown, 925 N.E.2d 845, 850-51 (Mass. 2010) (citing and reaf
firming Gonzalez).
131. See Randall T. Shepard, In a Federal Case, Is the State Constitution Some
thing Important or Just Another Piece of Paper?, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1437, 1445
52 (2005) (criticizing this state-to-federal version of the silver platter doctrine).
132. Others have made a related point, observing that the need for uniformity in
federal law is not categorical but rather varies depending on the extent to which the
norm and its likely violation is confined to single states or, alternatively, will involve
“interstate spillovers.” See Michael Solimine, The Future of Parity, 46 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1457, 1485 (2005) (citing and quoting RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS:
CHALLENGE AND REFORM 288-89 (1996)). Although the spillovers that Solimine and
Posner considered were geographic, the same point holds for spillovers within a state if
the impact is on both state and federal actors.
133. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d at 356.
134. Id. at 366-67.
135. Id. at 369-70. The officers had obtained a warrant before installing and mon
itoring the GPS device, and the court went on to hold that the warrant satisfied Article
14’s reasonableness requirement. Id. at 371; see infra note 150.
136. Id. at 367-68.
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Circuit, will reach a different conclusion,137 deciding that this intru
sion is neither a “search” nor a “seizure” under the Fourth Amend
ment. In that event, under federal law police officers would be free
to install and to monitor these devices at their discretion,138 making
the the state’s enhanced search-and-seizure protection139 depen
dent on whether federal officers or state police install and monitor
the GPS. Indeed, even without any federal involvement, state of
ficers who install a GPS and seize the drugs in a case like Connolly
could hand the seized narcotics over to federal authorities for fed
eral prosecution, thus shielding their surveillance from enhanced
state-constitutional oversight. Finally, if (as is often the case) such
an investigation is conducted by a joint task force in which federal,
state, and local officers work together, the GPS surveillance would
remain beyond state-constitutional review even in state court if a
state judge decides that the investigation was predominately fed
eral.140 With so much potential for state and federal officers to
evade the enhanced protection announced in Connolly, it is difficult
to see the state as having the degree of sovereign independence
from the nation to claim the search-and-seizure norm as a separate,
state constitutional limitation on governmental power.
From a prudential perspective, judgments concerning the
meaning and reach of the search-and-seizure norm do not fit easily
into the conventional model of judicial decision making. Deciding
whether any particular investigative intrusion is, first of all, a
“search”—determined by assessing our society’s “reasonable ex
pectation[s] of privacy”141—and, if it is, whether that intrusion
marks a reasonable balance of the privacy and public-safety inter
ests there implicated, boil down to open-ended, often empirically
based policy judgments. Such decision making seems a far cry from
137. Indeed, a circuit split has developed on this issue, with the Seventh, Eighth,
and Ninth Circuits holding that GPS installation and monitoring does not constitute a
search under the Fourth Amendment, the D.C. Circuit holding that it does. Compare
United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604 (8th Cir. 2010), United States v. PinedaMoreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010), and United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994 (7th
Cir. 2007), with United States v. Maynard, 515 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
138. See, e.g., Marquez, 605 F.3d at 609.
139. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d at 369-70.
140. See Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 688 N.E.2d 455, 458 (Mass. 1997) (declin
ing to apply Article 14’s more demanding standard to police conduct because the inves
tigation in question was predominately federal, as opposed to a combined, state-federal
investigation); see also United States v. Pforzheimer, 826 F.2d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 1987);
People v. Coleman, 882 N.E.2d 1025, 1032 (Ill. 2008).
141. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring);
accord Connolly, 913 N.E.2d at 367.
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the application of established and more neutral principles typically
characteristic of judicial interpretation.
Of course, judges can and should utilize policy in their decision
making. The problem here is that the interest balancing that is nec
essarily a part of interpreting the search-and-seizure norm is a dif
ferent sort of policy application than that required to flesh out a
procedural protection such as the right to counsel. In answering
search-and-seizure claims, the decision maker is explicitly called on
to make empirical judgments concerning the way society works,142
and even more perilously, normative judgments concerning how it
ought to work,143 and then to translate the resulting conclusions
into a judgment of what constitutes a reasonable balance of the
competing individual and collective interests involved. Here, both
for reasons of institutional competence and of political legitimacy,
the political insulation of judges works against, not for, them as de
cision makers.
Policy judgments such as these are more characteristic of the
legislative process than the adjudicative process, and elected legisla
tors seem far better positioned than appointed judges to make these
calls.144 That seems all the more so given that this interest balanc
ing is inevitably a function of time and place, a point that seems
confirmed by the search-and-seizure doctrinal shifts, for example, in
responding to advancing technology during the past half-century or
so.145 At the least, we ought to pause before embedding any partic
142. Is there, objectively speaking, an actual expectation of privacy? See Katz,
389 U.S. at 360-61.
143. Is that expectation one which society is prepared to recognize as reasonable
or legitimate? Id.
144. Because the executive branch is directly involved in the law enforcement
process, I will take it as a given that it is not a candidate to strike this constitutional
balance.
145. The best, and in the end perhaps problematic, example is the Court’s shift to
the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test in Katz to define searches in the then-early
years of telecommunications and related technologies. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 360-62
(Harlan, J., concurring). In reviewing the Supreme Court’s application of this test in
deciding whether tracking a beeper constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment,
the Supreme Judicial Court in Connolly noted that “the Court has relied on the level of
sophistication of the particular electronic device, and the physical location from which
the device transmitted its signal, to determine whether use of the device interferes with
a reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore constitutes a search.” Connolly, 913
N.E.2d at 367.
This past term, the Supreme Court sounded this very note of caution in City of
Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010), a case in which the Court held that a city’s
review of the contents of a city employee’s messages that were recorded on a city-issued
communications device was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 2632-33.
Every justice except Justice Scalia agreed that “[t]he judiciary risks error by elaborating
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ular balance of interests in what some have aptly called the “consti
tutional calcification”146 that characterizes judicial constitutional
interpretation.
Using Connolly again as our example, to determine if installing
and monitoring a GPS device constitutes a “search” of the car or its
owner, a court must ask itself whether, empirically, people in our
society expect their cars to be free of such devices and the monitor
ing of movement that these devices enable, and, if so, whether nor
matively that expectation is one that society is prepared to accept as
reasonable.147 Alternatively, to determine if the intrusion consti
tutes a “seizure” of the car, a court must ask whether this investiga
tive technique constitutes “some meaningful interference with [the
owner’s] possessory interests in [the car]”148 even though the owner
would know nothing about the device and would retain full use of
the automobile, an equally fact-bound and value-laden question. If
the installation and monitoring of the GPS device constitutes a
“search” or a “seizure” of the car,149 the court must then ask under
too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role
in society has become clear.” Id. at 2629. Comparing today’s world with that of Katz,
when the justices felt comfortable looking “[to their] own . . . experience to conclude
that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in a telephone booth,” the Court ob
served that “[r]apid changes in the dynamics of communication and information trans
mission” make it difficult to “predict[ ] how . . . privacy expectations will be shaped . . .
or the degree to which society will be prepared to recognize those expectations as rea
sonable.” Id.
146. Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes
What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1692-93 (2005) (referring to constitutional
decisions immunized from legislative, or even subsequent judicial review, by virtue of
their asserted constitutional foundation).
147. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 360-61. As the Supreme Judicial Court put the ques
tion before deciding not to answer it with respect to GPS surveillance, is there “an
expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable”? Connolly, 913
N.E.2d at 367 (quoting United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984)).
148. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d at 367.
149. Id. at 369 & n.13. The court’s analysis of this issue was, it is fair to say,
wholly policy-based. The court began by observing that under Fourth Amendment
principles, to constitute a “seizure” of Connolly’s car, the installation and monitoring of
the GPS device to track the vehicle’s movements had to impose “some meaningful in
terference” with Connolly’s possessory interest in the car. Id. at 367, 369. In deciding
this test was met notwithstanding Connolly’s continuing possession and unfettered use
of the car, the court opined that “[t]he owner of property has a right to exclude it from
‘all the world,’ and the police use [of the car to conduct surveillance] ‘infringes [on] that
exclusionary right.’. . . [Such surveillance] is a seizure not by virtue of the technology
employed, but because the police use private property (the vehicle) to obtain informa
tion for their own purposes.” Id. at 369-70 (citations omitted) (quoting Karo, 468 U.S.
at 729 (Stevens, J., dissenting)). As authority, the court cited only Justices Stevens’
dissenting opinion in Karo, a case in which the Supreme Court held that police moni
toring of a beeper that they had installed in a drum of chemicals prior to the defen
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what circumstances would it be “reasonable” for the police to em
ploy this investigative technique.150 These questions require bal
ancing individual privacy interests against collective public-safety
interests—both in some sense liberty interests151—and their an
swers depend on the sort of policy considerations, grounded in time
and space, that seem ill-suited for courts to decide in an adjudica
tive context. They are rather quintessentially legislative
decisions.152
The legislature is the governmental body elected to address
such policy issues, and its decisions have political legitimacy and
accountability that judicial decisions do not share.153 Moreover, the
legislature has more appropriate tools to explore the practical
ramifications of such an issue,154 freeing it from the narrow factual
predicate of a judicial decision and allowing input of the citizenry
that is missing from judicial decision making. Public hearings, open
debate, and voting by elected representatives would replace the re
cord and briefs of the parties, perhaps augmented by amicus sub
missions, followed by necessarily cloistered deliberation and
decision making of appointed judges. And, if due to conditions un
dant’s purchase of the drum did not constitute either a search or a seizure as long as the
drum remained in a public place, theoretically open to the view of the public. Karo, 468
U.S. at 708, 713-14.
150. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d.at 371. Once the Supreme Judicial Court decided that
the GPS installation and monitoring constituted a seizure requiring a warrant, it had
further to decide whether a warrant issued under the common-law authority of the
courts would suffice to satisfy the constitutional requirement of reasonableness or
whether instead the constitution requires one issued under a state statute, MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 276, § 1 (2008), that limits execution of the warrant to a seven-day period
following its issuance. The court held that because the search authorized would not
yield tangible property, the statutory provision—which did not mention GPS or similar
devices but rather facially applied to search warrants for tangible property—is inappli
cable to a warrant to install and monitor a GPS device. Id.
151. See INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 6, at 84.
152. Indeed, in the wake of the federal circuit split on the question of whether
installation and monitoring of a GPS device constitutes a “search” under the Fourth
Amendment, the Boston Globe lead editorial on September 2, 2010, admonished Con
gress to step in and “impose reasonable guidelines on the use of high-tech surveillance
without a warrant or probable cause.” Editorial, Supreme Court, Congress Need New
Rules for GPS Searches, BOS. GLOBE, Sept. 2, 2010, http://www.boston.com/boston
globe/editorial_opinion/editorials/articles/2010/09/02/supreme_court_congress_need_
new_rules_for_gps_searches/.
153. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 323 (2002) (explaining the constitutional
role of legislatures: “[I]n a democratic society legislatures, not courts, are constituted to
respond to the will and consequently the moral values of the people” (alteration in
original) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976))).
154. Included in this calculus would be the costs in confusion arising from the
different standards.
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foreseen or a sense based on subsequent experience that the deci
sion was a mistake, a legislative decision would be subject to review
and change, a plasticity missing in judicial constitutional decisions.
There is certainly a place for policy-based judicial decision making,
but the open interest balancing informed by society’s reasonable
expectations and societal conventions155 that is necessary to give
meaning to the search-and-seizure norm is not such a place.156
Dean Sager thus excluded the search-and-seizure norm from his
under-enforcement theory,157 noting that such contextual interest
balancing makes it an inapt candidate for such analysis.158
Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, one could argue
that no court—including the Supreme Court—should strike the in
terest balance that interpreting the search-and-seizure norm re
quires, but my argument need not go that far. My point here is one
of judicial prudence grounded as much in institutional competence
as decisional legitimacy. The Court has incorporated the Fourth
Amendment’s search-and-seizure norm into the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, thus imposing it on the
states.159 As such, it falls to the Court, as the final arbiter of federal
law, to decide its meaning as a national, foundational limit on state
action. My point is that state courts should defer to the Court con
cerning the content of that normative balance, not that no court
could ever decide that meaning.
Beyond these conceptual and prudential reasons counseling
state-court deference to the Supreme Court concerning the mean
ing of constitutional search-and-seizure protections lie practical rea
sons for normative uniformity as well.160 The search-and-seizure
norm has become immensely complicated as courts struggle to craft
the intermediate standards and particular rules by which this openended norm is applied in each investigative context.161 The never
155. See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 111 (2006) (using the yardstick of
“widely shared social expectations” to measure the content of third-party consent as a
basis for a reasonable search).
156. To be sure, any such legislative action would be subject to the Fourteenth
Amendment’s up-only limitation, and it could well fall to the state court in reviewing
that policy in a particular case to make that determination. Since federal law to this
point has examined the search-and-seizure norm principally from the perspective of
protection against police excesses, that would be the perspective of the state court in
answering this federal question.
157. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
158. See Fair Measure, supra note 108, at 1244 n.104.
159. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961).
160. See infra note 162 and accompanying text.
161. See infra note 162 and accompanying text.
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ending stream of Fourth Amendment cases that each year are de
cided and reported throughout the nation bears witness to this con
tinual expansion and mutation of the doctrine.162 As already noted,
this norm and its doctrinal web is aimed at and must be applied by
police officers in the field, often in the face of unanticipated, rapidly
unfolding circumstances.163 The set of rules limning the bounds of
constitutional behavior is complicated enough without adding an
other, separate layer of state doctrine on top of extant federal stan
dards and rules. To be sure, conflicts between state and federal
rules or standards should, for state officers, be resolved in favor of
the more demanding state rules, and state and local officers would
presumably be trained in accordance with the state version of the
norm. But two layers of overlapping rules cannot but create confu
sion, particularly in instances in which state and federal officers op
erate with one another, each subject to different rules. This
possibility of confusion further dilutes the added protection that in
dividuals might receive from an ostensibly more demanding state
constitutional version of this norm.
None of this suggests, however, that state courts are relegated
to the sidelines in interpreting or applying the search-and-seizure
norm, only that deference to the Supreme Court here is appropri
ate. When, as in a case like Connolly, the federal meaning or scope
of the normative protection is open, state courts are free—indeed,
obligated—to flesh out the meaning of the norm, but as a matter of
162. Almost every term, the Supreme Court decides several Fourth Amendment
cases that extend or change the face of the search-and-seizure norm or its remedy. See,
e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009) (overturning almost thirty years of case law
governing the limits of automobile searches incident to the arrest of a recent occupant);
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) (extending the exclusionary rule’s goodfaith exception to the fruits of arrests based on faulty, negligently maintained police
records of outstanding warrants). The ink on these opinions was barely dry before a
circuit split arose on the application of the exclusionary rule’s good-faith exception to
fruits of car searches, lawful when conducted but unlawful after Gant. Compare United
States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1042-45 (10th Cir. 2009) (applying good-faith excep
tion to exclusionary rule to evidence obtained in reliance on Belton, the case overruled
by Gant), with United States v. Gonzalez, 578 F.3d 1130, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 2009) (de
clining to apply good-faith exception based on Belton reliance, citing conflict with retro
activity principles). In Davis v. United States, 598 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 2010), cert.
granted, 131 S. Ct. 502 (2010), the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to resolve
this issue. And so it goes and will continue to go.
Viewing this doctrinal growth from the admittedly parochial perspective of a law
professor, the same casebook’s pages that I have used in teaching just a portion of
Fourth Amendment law over the past quarter century have more than doubled, from
some 300 to well over 600, an admittedly crude but nevertheless telling measure of the
increasing breadth and complexity of this search-and-seizure doctrine.
163. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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federal, not state, law.164 At the time the Supreme Judicial Court
considered Connolly, there were some tea leaves from old Supreme
Court decisions from which one could attempt to predict how the
Court might answer the question, along with a few lower federal
court and state supreme court decisions going both ways, but there
was nothing close to definitive concerning the Fourth Amendment’s
answer to this question.165 There was even less certainty under Ar
ticle 14.166 The only thing certain was that the Supreme Judicial
Court, the highest court in Massachusetts, had undoubted positivelaw authority to found its decision in either provision, federal or
state.167 Had the court based its decision on the Fourth Amend
ment, the decision would have resolved Connolly’s constitutional
claim,168 would have been consistent with the presumption of a na
tional uniform search-and-seizure norm, and would have afforded
the Supreme Judicial Court a timely and appropriate voice in the
development of this fundamental normative protection.169 That is
hardly a sidelines role in national search-and-seizure jurisprudence.
CONCLUSION
Let me conclude by returning to Dean Sager’s question: when
in state-constitutionalism should a state court defer to the Supreme
Court in the interpretation of a cognate constitutional provision?170
As a matter of presumption, always. Given that the constitutional
164. Commonwealth v. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d 356, 367-68 (Mass. 2009).
165. Id.
166. See id. at 369-70. As noted above, the only authority that the court cited in
support of its Article 14 holding was a dissenting opinion by Justice Stevens in a twentyfive year-old case. Id. at 369 (citing United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 728 (1984)).
167. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d at 369-70.
168. If the court had couched its decision in Connolly as a Fourth Amendment
decision, there would have been nothing further for the court to decide under Article
14. As noted, the court went on to hold that the execution of the GPS warrant within a
fifteen-day period (which was outside the seven-day period required by Massachusetts
statute for the execution of some warrants) was reasonable, but this was as a matter of
state common law, not constitutional law. See id. at 371.
169. One of the criticisms of state-court deference to the Supreme Court, either
through the lockstepping or supplemental approach, is that the differing views of the
state courts on these important constitutional issues are lost, providing no counter
weight to the views of the nine judges on the Court. That may be a price to be paid for
national uniformity as to those cognate provisions for which the presumption holds, but
not always, as this case shows. However the issue might ultimately be decided by the
Supreme Court, if it ever is, the Supreme Judicial Court would have been heard and
could have provided authority, albeit limited to its persuasive force outside the Com
monwealth, concerning the Fourth Amendment’s meaning in this regard, a matter that
is almost certain to arise elsewhere.
170. Sager, supra note 1, at 959.
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overlap here at issue only arises in the case of core constitutional
values common to the nation and its fifty constituent parts, a pre
sumption of common meaning, state and federal, is justified. And
in our nation, in which states are assigned a subordinate role, if
judgments differ concerning the content of a fundamental constitu
tional norm, it again seems justifiable to look to the Supreme Court
as the constitutional arbiter.
But this presumption of uniformity, with state-court deference
to the Supreme Court in its service, should give way in the face of
compelling conceptual and practical reasons. As I have tried to
demonstrate, all constitutional norms—even fundamental ones—
are not the same. If as is true with the protection against unreason
able searches and seizures, the normative protection delineates a
core liberty interest common to both the nation and its fifty constit
uent states, it makes sense that the subordinates in that political
relationship defer to their superior concerning the meaning and
scope of that interest. Certainly in the case of the search-and
seizure norm, this deference is more than an aesthetic preference,
because the states’ subordinate status is underscored by their innate
inability to fully implement a different, expanded version of that
norm within their own borders. So, without even accounting for
prudential and practical concerns that counsel against state consti
tutional expansion of search-and-seizure protections, state courts
simply have no business re-configuring this national balance of con
stitutional interests.
On the other hand, there are many constitutional protections,
like the right to counsel, that provide procedural protection to the
fundamental liberty interest in avoiding wrongful convictions.
Here, states overcome their subordinate status and with it the pre
sumption that their courts ought to defer to the Supreme Court in
giving state constitutional shape to these core normative protec
tions. Enhancing the right-to-counsel protection or ones like it for
tifies rather than redefines the underlying, national liberty interest,
and states are able to fully implement such expanded protections
because their reach is wholly local.
In the end, allowing or even encouraging state constitutional
expansion of core national constitutional protections does not force
a choice between deference and dissonance. Fundamental norma
tive protections that are by nature uniquely national, where states
cannot escape their subordinate status, should be the province of
the nation and its Supreme Court. But those normative protec
tions, although of fundamental, national import, that are essentially
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local in their implementation and effect should be fair game for in
dependent state constitutional enhancement. There is nothing dis
sonant about lack of deference in that instance. It is merely playing
out Professor Gardner’s observation that in our brand of federal
ism, states are in that peculiar position of sometimes being
subordinate to—but other times being independent of—the nation
of which they are a part.

